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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jonnine Sittre contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied her presentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI). That motion
was based on the fact that Ms. Sittre had received a letter from a previously-absent witness. The
author of that letter admitted it had been he, and not Ms. Sittre, who was driving the car in
question when it wrecked and that he had immediately left the scene. As such, that new
evidence provided a just reason to allow Ms. Sittre to withdraw her plea. As such, the district
court erred by not, as the Idaho Supreme Court has instructed, liberally exercising its discretion
to allow the withdrawal of the plea. Therefore, this Court should reverse the order denying
Ms. Sittre’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Sittre was involved in a single-car accident at approximately 12:30 a.m. when the car
she was in rolled down an embankment and landed on its roof. (See 12/16/14 Tr., p.4, L.18 - p.6,
L.5, p.29, Ls.14-18.)1 An officer happened to see the accident occur, and when he got to the
wrecked car, he saw Ms. Sittre climbing out the passenger side of the vehicle. 2 (12/16/14
Tr., p.42, Ls.8-15.) Ms. Sittre was ultimately charged with DUI. (See R., pp.15-16.)
For her part, Ms. Sittre could not remember much about the events of that evening.
(5/11/15 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.18.) However, defense counsel noted that Ms. Sittre had

1

Since the transcripts were provided in various volumes, to promote clarity, citations thereto will
include the date of the hearing. Additionally, the 12/16/14 transcript of the preliminary hearing
is provided in the PDF document entitled “CERTIFICATE OF EXHBITS SITTRE 44571.”
Citations thereto will refer to the transcript page number, not the PDF page number.
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consistently maintained that someone else had been driving the car. 3

(3/14/16 Tr., p.44,

Ls.21 23.) Unfortunately, Ms. Sittre began suffering medical issues while in jail, and she felt the
treatment being provided in the jail was not adequate to address her conditions. (See, e.g.,
R., pp.151-56, 191-92). As a result, she sought a plea agreement, a part of which would include
presentence release from custody, during which time, she could see her own physician.
(See 5/11/15 Tr., p.8, Ls.22-24 (trial counsel recounting that the plea included “a collateral
agreement that she would be released today pending sentencing, and there is a variety of reasons
for that . . .”); 3/14/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.15-18 (trial counsel explaining Ms. Sittre “felt as if she
needed to make a decision, felt that she was under some pressure to do what she needed to do to
get out to take care of her physical and mental health. So as a result of that, she chose the
plea.”).)
However, there had apparently been some miscommunication about the plea agreement
between Ms. Sittre and her attorney. 4 For example, she initially indicated her intent was to enter
a conditional plea so as to reserve her right to challenge the results of the blood test as part of
that plea. 5 (See R., p.200 (the answer “yes” to the question of whether the plea was conditional
is crossed out).) The court held a recess, during which, trial counsel convinced her to waive that
claim, lest she forfeit the benefit of her bargain. (See 5/11/15 Tr., p.13, L.20 - p.14, L.14; 3/14/16

2

A civilian eyewitness testified he saw Ms. Sittre come out of the driver’s side of the car.
(12/16/14 Tr., p.8, L.21 - p.10, L.1.)
3
The civilian eyewitness only recalled seeing one person in the car prior to the accident, but
admitted he could not really see into the back seat. (12/16/14 Tr., p.6, L.19 - p.7, L.13.) He also
testified he was able to get to the edge of the embankment within a few seconds, and he did not
recall seeing anyone else in the area of the wrecked car. (12/16/14 Tr., p.10, L.17 - p.11, L.14).
4
Except for the preliminary hearing, Ms. Sittre was represented by John Souza during the
relevant portions of this case; he subsequently withdrew prior to the sentencing hearing because
he was closing down his practice and surrendering his license to practice law. (See R., p.267.)
5
At the time of the change of plea hearing, the district court had not yet ruled on Ms. Sittre’s
motion to suppress the blood test results. (See generally R.)
2

Tr., p.44, Ls.11-16.) Additionally, when the district court asked trial counsel if anyone else had
been in the car the night of the accident, he answered:
No, Your Honor. There was a contested prelim. I can make this factual
representation -- . . . There were witnesses that testified at that preliminary that
she was either in or exiting the vehicle or close by, and that, at least according to
them, that there wasn’t anybody else in the area that would have been driving. So
that’s the information that was presented, and based on that she was bound over.
(5/11/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.4-18.) With those clarifications by trial counsel, Ms. Sittre entered, and
the district court accepted, her guilty plea. (See 5/11/15 Tr., p.25, L.6 - p.26, L.2.)
Following entry of that plea, the presentence investigator attempted to interview
Ms. Sittre twice, once on May 27, 2015, and again on January 27, 2016, 6 but “[b]oth times,
Jonnine stated she wanted to withdraw her guilty plea and that she had obtained a new
attorney.[7]

She also had not completed her presentence questionnaire as instructed.”

(PSI, p.28.) After the PSI was prepared, trial counsel deliberately did not provided Ms. Sittre
with a copy of the PSI report, and did not intend to do so until the motion to withdraw her plea
was resolved. (3/14/16 Tr., p.32, Ls.18-20.)
Ultimately, Ms. Sittre filed a pro se motion to withdraw her plea, and she attached a copy
of a letter she had received from Barry “Yoshamm” 8 to that motion. (R., p.227; see R., p.246
(legible copy of the same letter).) That letter was dated December 2015 and was post-marked on
January 26, 2016. (R., p.246.) In that letter, Barry admitted that he had been driving the car
when it wrecked and that he had immediately left the scene of the accident. (R., p.246.) At an

6

A bench warrant was issued for Ms. Sittre in June 2015, and it was not served until December
2015. (See R., p.214.)
7
Due to monetary issues, Ms. Sittre ultimately decided to continue with Mr. Souza as her
attorney. (See generally 2/22/16 Tr.)
8
Because the signature of the last name on that letter is not particularly legible (See R., p.246),
the author of that letter will be referred to herein as “Barry.”
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initial hearing on her motion, Ms. Sittre explained, “I always wanted to withdraw this guilty plea,
and now I have new evidence” to support that motion. (2/22/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-13.)
Trial counsel then filed a supplemental motion to withdraw the plea based on the fact that
Ms. Sittre had taken the plea deal because of her concerns about getting adequate medical
treatment, and that after entering the plea, she had received the new evidence which revealed she
had a defense to the charge against her. (R., pp.239-40.) In addition to Barry’s letter, trial
counsel provided a copy of a letter, dated December 31, 2015, from Ms. Sittre’s sister.
(R., p.243.) The sister’s letter, which was notarized, explained that she had dropped Ms. Sittre
off with Barry on the evening of the accident, and that the sister had happened to have a
conversation with Barry in June 2015, during which he told the sister it had been he who was
driving on the night of the accident. (R., p.243.) However, the sister also explained that she did
not realize Barry was a transient who was from Utah, and that he had disappeared after the June
2015 conversation. (R., p.243.) Trial counsel subsequently indicated he thought Barry could be
made available to testify. (3/14/16 Tr., p.36, L.10.)
The district court concluded that “the idea that there was some other person driving the
vehicle was clearly discounted on the record in front of Miss Sittre, who did not object to the
idea that she was driving the motor vehicle, that she was under the influence of alcohol, and it
was over the legal limit.” (3/14/16 Tr., p.43, L.23 - p.44, L.4.) It also concluded that, because of
the time since the offense occurred, granting the motion would be prejudicial to the State.
(3/14/16 Tr., p.49, Ls.3-5.) Based on that, it denied her motion to withdraw her plea. (3/14/16
Tr., p.44, Ls.5-6; R., p.260.) It subsequently imposed a unified sentence of ten years, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.299-301.) Ms. Sittre filed a notice of appeal timely from the
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.303-05.)

4

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Sittre’s pre-sentence motion
to withdraw her guilty plea.

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Sittre’s Pre-Sentence Motion To
Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
“The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of
the district court, and such discretion should be liberally applied.” State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho
219, 222 (2008). Thus, “[a]ppellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is
limited to whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action.” State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2008). When reviewing
the exercise of discretion, the appellate courts determine: “(1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).
The appellate courts have identified several legal standards relevant to the district court’s
exercise of discretion in regard to motions to withdraw guilty pleas. Notably, “[t]he timing of
the motion is significant; when the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only
show a ‘just reason’ to withdraw the plea.” Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. “Before sentencing, the
inconvenience to the court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as
compared to protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury.” Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535.
However, if the motion to withdraw the plea is filed “after the defendant has learned of the
content of the PSI or has received other information about the probable sentence, the district
court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant’s apparent motive.” Arthur, 145 Idaho
at 222. The district court’s decision in this case is not consistent with those standards, and so,
fails on the second step of the Hedger test.

6

Ms. Sittre filed her motion to withdraw her plea prior to sentencing.

(See R.,

pp.225, 296.) As the presentence investigator pointed out, Ms. Sittre had made the decision to
file that motion by the time of the PSI interviews, and, as a result, did not fully participate in the
PSI process. (See PSI, p.28.) Additionally, defense counsel withheld the PSI from Ms. Sittre
until the motion to withdraw the plea could be resolved.

(3/14/16 Tr., p.32, Ls.18-20.)

Therefore, Ms. Sittre’s motion fell squarely under Arthur’s instruction to liberally grant presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas upon a showing of a “just reason.” Arthur, 145 Idaho
at 222.
The discovery of new evidence can be a “just reason” to withdraw a guilty plea if the
nature of the evidence and its potential relevance to the case is sufficiently established on the
record by the defendant. See State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998); see also
United States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaching that same conclusion
through an analogous analysis under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B)).
Ms. Sittre satisfied that burden.

The new evidence was Barry’s letter, which included his

admission to being the driver when the accident occurred, and that he had left the scene of the
accident. (R., p.246.) That letter was not written until seven months after Ms. Sittre entered her
guilty plea. (See R., p.246.) Additionally, defense counsel represented that Barry could be made
available to testify to those facts.9 (3/14/16 Tr., p.36, L.10.) Furthermore, there was new
evidence in the notarized letter from Ms. Sittre’s sister, which corroborated parts of Barry’s
letter. (R., p.243.) Thus, the record is clear as to the nature and potential relevance of the newlydiscovered evidence – it would provide Ms. Sittre a complete defense to the charge of DUI. As

9

In the event Barry was ultimately unavailable to testify, his letter would then be admissible
under I.R.E. 804(b)(3) as a statement against interest, since that statement includes Barry
admitting to violating I.C. § 49-1301 (leaving the scene of an accident causing vehicle damage).
7

such, that newly-discovered evidence constitutes a “just reason” for withdrawing Ms. Sittre’s
guilty plea under Arthur.
The district court’s reasoning – that “the idea that there was some other person driving
the vehicle was clearly discounted on the record in front of Miss Sittre, who did not object to the
idea that she was driving the motor vehicle” (3/14/16 Tr., p.43, L.23 - p.44, L.4) – does not
change that conclusion for several reasons. First, that conclusion is, factually, clearly erroneous
because Ms. Sittre did “object” to the State’s version of events at the preliminary hearing in that
trial counsel sough to develop testimony which indicated the possibility that another person had
been driving the car. See Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003) (explaining a factual
finding is “clearly erroneous” when it is not supported by substantial, competent evidence).
In fact, during the officer’s testimony, the magistrate sustained defense counsel’s
objection to the prosecutor’s use of a feminine pronoun to refer to the driver of the car.
(See 2/16/14 Tr., p.33, Ls.9-24.) Moreover, when the prosecutor tried to follow up on that point,
the officer testified that he had not made any particular determination at the time of the incident
about whether the driver was male or female. (12/16/14 Tr., p.34, Ls.1-14.) Additionally, the
civilian witness admitted on cross-examination that the lighting was less than optimal on the
bridge that night, and he acknowledged that, while he had thought the driver of the car was
female due to the fact that the driver wore long hair, that feature was not determinative as to
gender. (12/16/14 Tr., p.23, L.19 - p.25, L.2.) Therefore, Ms. Sittre, through her attorney at the
time, did “object” to the State’s theory that she was the driver.
Second, “[t]he main purpose or function of the preliminary hearing is to ascertain
whether the crime charged has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
the accused committed it. The defendant is under no duty to present any evidence at the

8

preliminary hearing thought he may do so . . . .” State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251-52 (1971)
(internal citations omitted). Therefore, as trial counsel indicated, the magistrate could still, and
in fact did, bind Ms. Sittre over on the evidence presented by the State even with defense
counsel’s objections on the record. (See 5/11/15 Tr., p.24, Ls.4-18.) Thus, regardless of whether
Ms. Sittre objected to the State’s evidence during the preliminary hearing (or had she waived her
right to a preliminary hearing altogether), that fact would not be a basis to deny her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea because resolution of such issues is not the purpose of the preliminary
hearing, especially when that motion is based on evidence which she could not have had at the
time.
That is the third flaw in the district court’s analysis. Its conclusion, which is essentially
that Ms. Sittre should have made this argument earlier, misses the crucial point – Ms. Sittre
could not have presented the evidence which accompanied her motion to withdraw her plea at
any point before she pled guilty on May 11, 2015, because that evidence did not exist until seven
months after the fact. (See R., pp.243, 246.) The critical evidence – the letter from Barry
himself – was not written until December 2015 and was not mailed to Ms. Sittre until January
26, 2016. (See R., p.246.) Until she received that letter, Ms. Sittre could not have met her initial
burden of proof to establish the nature and relevance of the new evidence, and thus, a just reason,
to withdraw her plea, existed. See State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 486 (1993) (“more substantial
reasons than just asserting legal innocence must be given” to establish “just reason” to withdraw
a guilty plea); Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139 n.2 (noting mere allusions to new evidence without
establishing the nature and potential relevance thereof is not enough to establish a “just reason”
to withdraw a guilty plea). In fact, Ms. Sittre made this point to the district court: “I always
wanted to withdraw this guilty plea, and now I have new evidence” to support that motion.

9

(2/22/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-13.) Since she could not have actually made this argument earlier, the
fact that she did not is not a basis to deny her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
For all those reasons, the district court’s reliance on Ms. Sittre not “objecting” to the facts
the State presented as a basis to withdraw her plea is wholly improper. Under the proper
analysis, as identified in Hocker, this was newly-discovered evidence which constituted a just
reason for granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Finally, the district court’s analysis on the prejudice prong of the test is contrary to
controlling precedent. Once the defendant shows just reason to withdraw the plea, “the state
may avoid the granting of the motion by demonstrating that prejudice would result from the
plea.” Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485. Thus, the State bears the burden to prove prejudice in this
regard. The State offered no argument and made no showing that it would be unable to marshal
its evidence and proceed to trial if Ms. Sittre were allowed to withdraw her plea. (See generally
3/14/16 Tr., p.32, L.24 - p.35, L.14.) Rather, when the district court asked the prosecutor for his
position on the prejudice analysis, he only asserted that Ms. Sittre should have brought this
evidence forward earlier.

(3/14/16 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-22.)

Besides the myriad flaws in that

argument which were discussed supra, that argument does not show anything more than mere
inconvenience to the State, and that is not enough to carry its burden on the prejudice prong. As
the Court of Appeals clearly put it: “Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the court and
prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared to protecting the
right of the accused to trial by jury.” Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535.
In fact, the State would not be prejudiced by allowing Ms. Sittre to withdraw her plea. It
still, for example, has the test results, which could be admitted if the State lays the proper
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foundation.10 Similarly, the eyewitnesses could still be called to give testimony, and even if they
were unavailable, there are provisions by which the State could still potentially present their
testimony at trial. See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, ___, 383 P.3d 1259, 125255 (2016) (discussing the propriety of using preliminary hearing testimony in lieu of live
testimony at trial when a witness has become unavailable). Therefore, any inconvenience to the
State caused by granting the motion and holding a new trial in this case is slight because it still
could present its full case. When compared with Ms. Sittre’s right to a trial by jury, especially
given the nature of the newly-discovered evidence in this case, that inconvenience does not
demonstrate prejudice to the State. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535.
Because Ms. Sittre showed a just reason for withdrawing her plea (newly-discovered
evidence) and because the State failed to carry its burden to prove that granting that motion
would be prejudicial, the district court abused its discretion by not, as the Idaho Supreme Court
has instructed, liberally applying its discretion to allow her to withdraw her plea.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Sittre respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of June, 2017.
__________/S/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
10

That, of course, assumes there is no other no other reason to suppress the results of that test.
For example, before her attorney talked her out of pursuing that motion, lest she forfeit the
benefit of her plea bargain, Ms. Sittre had filed a motion to suppress alleging the blood draw was
illegal and the results were tainted and unreliable. (R., p.186.) That motion was not ruled on by
the district court before Ms. Sittre entered her guilty plea, and so, it would be pending if she were
allowed to withdraw that plea.
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